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DISCRIMINATORY DUALISM IN PROCESS:
TITLE IX, REVERSE TITLE IX, AND CAMPUS
SEXUAL ASSAULT
SARAH L. SWAN*
For decades, the Title IX process of adjudicating campus sexual assault
has been heavily weighted against complainants (usually women).
However, at some universities, this weighting has recently flipped, such that
Title IX procedures at these institutions now seem weighted not against
complainants, but against respondents (usually men). This “reverse Title
IX” trend is typically described as an overcorrection, stemming from
schools’ over-zealous attempts to comply with the Title IX requirements the
Obama Administration imposed in 2011.
This Article offers a different account of Title IX’s procedural flip. It
argues that Title IX’s procedural switch can be productively viewed
through the lens of discriminatory dualism. Discriminatory dualism posits
that structural discrimination frequently divides into two seemingly
opposite—but in fact mutually supportive—strands. Applying the theory of
discriminatory dualism here suggests that reverse Title IX is not a mere
overcorrection. Instead, it is part of a patterned, recurring, and common
way that structural discrimination upholds existing social hierarchies.
Echoing other examples of discriminatory dualism, Title IX’s twinned
procedural problems work to sustain existing gendered and social
hierarchies in three main ways. First, procedural unfairness to respondents
functions to “confirm” the stereotype underlying the initial procedural
problems with Title IX: that women are not credible witnesses and are
committed, at all costs, to punishing men for perceived slights and
imagined harms. Second, the emergence of the reverse Title IX strand
undermines the complaints about unfairness to complainants, suggesting
that they are misplaced and that the “real” problem is discrimination
against men. The confusion created by these dueling complaints
undermines the legitimacy of the Title IX system of adjudication as a whole,
rendering all findings potentially suspect. Finally, Title IX’s discriminatory
dualism creates a double bind, under which universities are portrayed as
* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. This Article was
written as part of the Oklahoma Law Review 2019 Symposium: Modern Sexual Conflicts
and the Law. Many thanks to Anita Bernstein, Claudia Haupt, and the participants of the
Symposium for their helpful comments and conversations.
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only capable of adjudicating in ways that are either unfair to complainants
or unfair to respondents. These consequences all work to the detriment of
those seeking gender equality.
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I. Introduction
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 declares that “[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”1 With a wide ambit that includes harassment and sexual
violence within its parameters,2 Title IX is an important legal vehicle for
preventing and remedying gender discrimination at educational
institutions.3 Title IX does not require universities to “guarantee[] the good
behavior” of students or completely “purge . . . campus of sexual
misconduct,” but it does require schools to avoid “deliberate indifference”
to these problems. 4 If school officials know about sexual misconduct
problems but decline to address them, the school can be liable for damages
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018).
2. Title IX, KNOW YOUR IX, https://www.knowyourix.org/college-resources/title-ix/
(last visited Aug. 10, 2020). The scope of Title IX was explicit in the 2011 Dear Colleague
Letter, which declared that “[s]exual harassment of students, which includes acts of sexual
violence, is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX.” See Letter from Russlynn
Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.
gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter].
3. Other legal vehicles include negligence claims and breach-of-contract claims. See
Liability for Student Sexual Assault: UE’s Claims Say OCR and Title IX Are Not the Biggest
Dangers, UNITED EDUCATORS (Mar. 20, 2017), https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/
search?q=cache:RND2NEXRPDgJ:https://www.ue.org/risk-management/insights-blog/%3
Fid%3D3287+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari.
4. Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093, 1114 (9th Cir. 2020). See
also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Davis v. Monroe Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). This Article uses the term “university” broadly to include
colleges and other post-secondary institutions as well.
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in court.5 Schools can also be liable for not taking “adequate preventative
steps” to discourage sexual misconduct.6 And the Office of Civil Rights can
bring administrative enforcement proceedings if institutions do not comply
with Title IX. 7
However, despite these mandates and enforcement mechanisms, prior to
2011 Title IX provided virtually no meaningful redress for those who
experienced campus sexual violence. 8 “Institutional barriers . . .
encourage[d] students to stay quiet,” and the students who did come
forward to file complaints found themselves embroiled in antiquated and
hostile procedural rules that “le[ft] them feeling victimized again.” 9 These
5. The High Cost of Student Victim Sexual Assault Claims and What Institutions Can
Do, CANOPY PROGRAMS (Mar. 2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53e530a1
e4b021a99e4dc012/t/590501f74402431ac4900596/1493500411575/FN-+RE-+2017.04+High+Cost+of+Student-Victim+SA+Claims.pdf [hereinafter CANOPY PROGRAMS].
6. See Susan D. Friedfel & Jason A. Ross, University’s Handling of Students’ PreAssault Complaints of Sexual Misconduct Open to Title IX Claim, JACKSONLEWIS (Feb. 14,
2020), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/university-s-handling-students-pre-assault
-complaints-sexual-misconduct-open-title-ix-claim (citing Karasek, 956 F.3d at 1111–12)
(describing the “‘pre-assault’ theory of deliberate indifference toward sexual assault on
campus,” where “the plaintiff alleges the university . . . did not take adequate preemptive
steps to avoid or lessen the likelihood of sexual misconduct on campus”). Under this theory
of liability, “the university is liable if a plaintiff is victimized by the sexual misconduct the
university should have helped avoid” or misconduct that comes about through the school
“maintaining ‘a policy of deliberate indifference that heighten[s] the risk of sexual
harassment on campus’ prior to a sexual assault.” Id. See generally Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX
and Official Policy Liability: Maximizing the Law’s Potential to Hold Education Institutions
Accountable for Their Responses to Sexual Misconduct, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 35 (2020).
7. CANOPY PROGRAMS, supra note 5. Importantly, “[w]hat funding recipients’
responsibilities are under Title IX and what they can be held liable for in a private cause of
action for damages . . . are not one and the same.” Doe v. Bibb Cty. Sch. Dist., 126 F. Supp.
3d 1366, 1377 (M.D. Ga. 2015), aff’d, 688 F. App’x 791 (11th Cir. 2017).
8. Most victims of sexual assault are women. MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NAT’L CTR.
FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, NATIONAL INTIMATE P ARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 18 (NOV. 2011), https://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/
pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf; see also Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of Consequences for
Sexual Assault, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity.
org/2010/02/24/4360/lack-consequences-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/D379-ALQY]. Yet
men can also be victims of sexual assault. For some of the challenges men face when
attempting to receive redress for sexual assault they experience on campus and off, see
Alexandra Flanagan & Phoenix Tso, Inside the Student Activist Movement: Tufts and Sexual
Violence, JEZEBEL (Feb. 19, 2014, 5:00 PM), https://jezebel.com/inside-the-student-activistmovement-tufts-university-1526094401, and see generally Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2011).
9. JD Solomon, Sexual Assaults on Campus: Journalist Talks About “Frustrating
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rules included requirements that complainants produce independent
corroborating evidence, meet a higher burden of proof than is typical in a
civil case, and file their complaints within a short window. 10 Given that
sexual assault typically occurs in private with no additional direct witnesses
other than the parties, and that it often takes a complainant some time to
decide whether they want to pursue justice within formal remedial
channels, these hurdles proved insurmountable to many.11 Under these
procedural standards, “campus adjudications were often confusing,
‘shrouded in secrecy,’ and marked by lengthy delays,” 12 and sexual assault
victims only rarely received redress.13
Following intense media scrutiny of these widespread institutional
failures to address campus sexual assault,14 the Obama administration in
2011 sought to change this status quo. It issued a non-binding Dear
Colleague Letter instructing universities to implement more equitable

Search for Justice,” UNIV. BUS. (Mar. 19, 2014), https://universitybusiness.com/sexualassaults-on-campus-journalist-talks-about-frustrating-search-for-justice/; see also Rachael A.
Goldman, Note, When Is Due Process Due? The Impact of Title IX Sexual Assault
Adjudication on the Rights of University Students, 47 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 185, 207 (2020).
10. See, e.g., Wendy J. Murphy, Using Title IX’s “Prompt and Equitable” Hearing
Requirements to Force Schools to Provide Fair Judicial Proceedings to Redress Sexual
Assault on Campus, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (2006); Michelle J. Anderson,
Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1943
(2016).
11. See Murphy, supra note 10, at 1018.
12. Goldman, supra note 9, at 187.
13. After examining a survey of 152 college-crisis-services programs, ten years of Title
IX complaints, and interviews with fifty experts, one study concluded that students found
responsible for perpetrating campus sexual assaults often faced “little or no consequence[s].”
Lombardi, supra note 8; see also Goldman, supra note 9, at 187–88 (citing Nick Anderson,
Colleges Often Reluctant to Expel for Sexual Violence, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/colleges-often-reluctant-to-expel-forsexual-violence--with-u-va-a-prime-example/2014/12/15/307c5648-7b4e-11e4-b821503cc7efed9e_story.html) (“Nationally, in 2014, only 12% of the 478 sanctions for sexual
assault on university campuses were expulsions, meaning that the other 88% of guilty
perpetrators received some other form of discipline (or none at all).”). Some schools, like the
University of Virginia, used the sanction so rarely that between 2004 and 2014, the
University of Virginia did not expel a single student for sexual misconduct, even though
“many students” had been expelled for other misconduct. Id.
14. Hannah Walsh, Note, Further Harm and Harassment: The Cost of Excess Process
to Victims of Sexual Violence on College Campuses, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1785, 1785
(2020).
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procedures.15 In its wake, however, some universities blew past the letter’s
recommendations and adopted their own procedural rules that drastically
departed from those suggested. 16 Though the letter encouraged universities
to implement fair procedures that would grant both parties similar access to
information and similar opportunities to be heard, some schools instead
implemented procedures that actively disadvantaged respondents. 17 For
instance, some schools set up procedures that denied respondents access to
basic materials, including the investigative report, the “notice of the factual
basis of the charges, the evidence gathered,” and “the identities of
witnesses.”18 At these schools, Title IX adjudication essentially flipped
from being weighted against complainants to being weighted against
respondents. Evidentiary hurdles that complainants could not possibly
overcome and cursory hearings designed to favor respondents transformed
into presumptions and procedures that were instead unfair to respondents.
This flip is most commonly described as an “over-correction” brought
about by schools simply trying too hard to meet the Obama-era
guidelines. 19 This Article offers a different account for this phenomenon. It

15. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 2.
16. See Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX and Procedural Fairness: Why Disciplined-Student
Litigation Does Not Undermine the Role of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault, 78 MONT. L.
REV. 71, 82–84 (2017) (observing that complaints regarding colleges’ response to sexual
violence have increased since the Dear Colleague Letter and that there have been findings of
colleges utilizing procedures that do not adhere to the letter’s recommendations).
17. Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Fairness for All Students Under Title IX 2 (Aug. 21,
2017),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33789434/Fairness%20for%20All%20
Students.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see Buzuvis, supra note 16, at 72 n.5 (first citing Emily Yoffe, The College
Rape Overcorrection, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
double_x/doublex/2014/12/college_rape_campus_sexual_assault_is_a_serious_problem_but
_the_efforts.html; then Gregg Bernstein, An Overcorrection on Campus Sexual Assault
Policies?, BALT. SUN (Feb. 15, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/oped/bs-ed-bernstein-0215-20150214-story.html; and then Max Kutner, The Other Side of the
Sexual Assault Crisis, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 18, 2015, 5:33 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/
2015/12/18/other-side-sexual-assault-crisis-403285.html); see also Walsh, supra note 14, at
1787 nn. 11–15 (citing Open Letter from Members of the Penn Law Sch. Faculty on Sexual
Assault Complaints: Protecting Complainants and Accused Students at Universities (Feb. 18,
2015), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/2015_0218_upenn.pdf); Editorial
Board, New Guidance on Campus Sexual Assault Is Ill-Timed and Partially Ill-Advised. But
It’s Not a Return to the Bad Old Days, WASH. POST (May 19, 2020, 4:37 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/new-guidance-on-campus-sexual-assault-is-ill-timed-and-
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argues that a situation in which some schools use procedures that are
stacked against complainants, while others use procedures that are stacked
against respondents, 20 is productively viewed as an example of
discriminatory dualism. 21 Discriminatory dualism describes structural
discrimination’s frequent tendency to divide into two seemingly opposite,
but in fact mutually supportive strands. 22 Often in response to agitations for
social change or to legal interventions which make one path less tenable,
structural discrimination sometimes separates into two strands that seem
distinct and contradictory, but are actually two sides of the same coin. 23
These two opposing discriminatory practices work together to reinforce
social hierarchies and maintain systems of subordination. 24
Discriminatory dualism appears in multiple contexts, with notable
examples occurring in employment, housing, and policing.25 For instance,
discriminatory dualism appears in employment when female employees
receive both unwanted sexual attention in the form of sexual harassment
and shunning in the form of coworkers refusing to engage with them
entirely.26 A similar paradox exists in housing, where minority
homeownership is suppressed by both redlining—the denial of credit based
on race—and reverse redlining—the over-offering of credit on exploitative
terms.27 And in policing, communities of color paradoxically experience
both overpolicing in the form of the aggressive overenforcement of minor,
petty crime, and underpolicing in the form of the persistent failure to
address violent crime. 28 Along with these examples, the phenomenon of

partially-ill-advised-but-its-not-a-return-to-the-bad-old-days/2020/05/19/f6aaedc2-994111ea-ac72-3841fcc9b35f_story.html.
20. See Buzuvis, supra note 16, at 83–84 (observing practices schools have adopted that
disadvantage complainants); Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 1 (noting that Harvard
University’s procedures are “overwhelmingly stacked against the accused”).
21. The discussion of discriminatory dualism in notes 22–30, 79–84, 100–06 and
accompanying text largely initially appeared in Sarah L. Swan, Discriminatory Dualism, 54
GA. L. REV. 869 (2020).
22. Id. at 872.
23. Id. at 873. Discriminatory dualism is a form of adaptive discrimination. See Elise C.
Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016).
24. Swan, supra note 21, at 872.
25. Id. at 873.
26. Id. at 872–73.
27. Id. at 872.
28. Id.
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discriminatory dualism also occurs in many other countries and in many
additional contexts.29
The lens of discriminatory dualism helps to show that flips into a reverse
discriminatory form are not mere overcorrections: they are a patterned,
recurring, and common way that structural discrimination upholds existing
hierarchies and perpetuates preservation-through-transformation.30 By
developing into two contradictory forms, structural discrimination
ironically manages to maintain and perpetuate the same inequalities that
fueled its original form. With the emergence of “reverse Title IX”—Title
IX adjudications that procedurally disadvantage defendants 31—Title IX
adjudication has also become an example of discriminatory dualism.
Title IX’s discriminatory dualism, though, has an interesting twist: at
first it appears as though the group receiving the discrimination has
changed. 32 Title IX processes once clearly disadvantaged women, and now
at some schools it seems like they may disadvantage men.33 But applying
the theory of discriminatory dualism suggests that this second strand of
procedural unfairness ultimately functions to reinforce existing gender and
social hierarchies. On a collective and structural level, women remain the
group that will lose most by Title IX’s discriminatory dualism. 34
29. Id. at 872 n.1 (noting that under and overpolicing has been observed in Canada and
Australia, a phenomenon similar to redlining and reverse redlining has been observed in
South Africa and New Zealand, and sexual harassment and shunning has been observed in
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and South Korea). Discriminatory dualism also
occurs in higher education, through the pattern of denial and then exploitative over-access
for racial minorities. Id. at 922. Additionally, discriminatory dualism has occurred in the
context of marriage, through coverture and reverse coverture, denying and then overprescribing marriage as a cure for poverty, and denying and then obligating marriage in the
LGBTQ context. See Sarah L. Swan, Marrying Discriminatory Dualism (May 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
30. Preservation-through-transformation is a term coined by Professor Reva Siegel,
describing the phenomena that occur when “[e]fforts to reform a status regime bring about
changes in its rule structure and justificatory rhetoric,” yet the discrimination itself persists.
Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997).
31. See Greta Anderson, More Title IX Lawsuits by Accusers and Accused, INSIDE
HIGHER ED. (October 3, 2019) (crediting attorney Laura Dunn for introducing the term
“reverse Title IX”), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/10/03/students-lookfederal-courts-challenge-title-ix-proceedings.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Part III.
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This is so for three reasons. Discriminatory dualism often involves
seemingly confirmed stereotypes, confusion surrounding identifying the
“real” problem, and the creation of a double-bind in which the only
available options are discriminatory. 35 Those three characteristics are
present in this iteration of discriminatory dualism as well. First, procedural
unfairness to respondents functions to “confirm” the stereotype underlying
the initial procedural problems with Title IX: that women are not credible
witnesses and are committed, at all costs, to punishing men for perceived
slights and imagined harms. Second, reverse Title IX undermines the
arguments about the continuing problem of unfairness to complainants at
many institutions and sows confusion over the nature of Title IX’s “real” or
most significant problem. This confusion destabilizes and discredits the
entire system of Title IX adjudication, rendering all findings of
responsibility in the Title IX context seemingly suspect. Finally, Title IX’s
discriminatory dualism establishes a double bind, under which universities
are portrayed as only able to adjudicate in ways that are either procedurally
unfair to complainants or procedurally unfair to respondents, but simply
incapable of adjudicating fairly.
Systems of discriminatory dualism often last decades (sometimes even
centuries),36 and their histories show multiple oscillations between each
strand rising and falling in dominance. 37 At this particular point in time,
Title IX is also in a moment of profound oscillation. In response to the
procedurally untenable situation created by the discriminatory dualism of
unfairness to complainants and unfairness to respondents, the Trump
administration released new Title IX regulations in the spring of 2020. 38
Among other controversial changes, these regulations allow for a higher
evidentiary standard and re-import presumptions rooted in criminal law. 39
As these changes take effect, those seeking Title IX’s promise of gender
equality fear the reforms will push Title IX back to once again weighting
adjudications almost universally against complainants.40 The historic
35. Swan, supra note 21, at 901.
36. See id. at 925.
37. See id. at 873.
38. These new regulations became binding on August 14, 2020. See Melinda Kaufmann,
The Deadline for Updating Your Title IX Policies is Fast Approaching: Will Your District Be
Ready?, JDSUPRA (July 29, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-deadline-forupdating-your-title-ix-77543/.
39. See infra notes 155–63.
40. See infra notes 164–66.
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patterns of discriminatory dualism suggests that these fears are wellfounded, 41 and that until broader social changes are achieved, the goal of
gender equality through Title IX may remain elusive.
II. Title IX’s Procedural Problems
Title IX adjudication for sexual misconduct currently operates in two
main modes: procedurally unfair to complainants or procedurally unfair to
respondents.42 Although the latter mode has recently received significant
media attention, thus perhaps giving the impression that it is the primary
problem in this area,43 in actuality sexual misconduct victims bring more
lawsuits against schools and are more successful in those lawsuits than
respondents.44 As the nation’s largest post-secondary insurer noted in 2018,
claims related to campus sexual assault constituted the bulk of their payouts
to universities, and the majority of that bulk “went primarily to victims of
sexual assault.”45 Statistics compiled from 2011–2015 reflect a similar
reality: of nearly $31 million in claims related to campus sexual assault,
approximately $22 million went to victims, with the remaining $9 million
going to those accused of sexual misconduct.46
High payouts to complainants continue to occur because many schools
continue to participate in the historical tradition of mishandling campus
sexual assault allegations and skewing Title IX procedures against

41. Swan, supra note 21, at 873.
42. There are also, presumably, some schools which do fairly balance procedures.
Nevertheless, the volume of litigation on both sides and the fervor over the new rules
suggest that erring on either side is much more common.
43. Sarah L. Swan, Between Title IX and the Criminal Law: Bringing Tort Law to the
Campus Sexual Assault Debate, 64 KAN. L. REV. 963, 978–79 (2016) (“Although perpetrator
suits tend to attract more media attention, victims actually bring lawsuits more frequently,
and those suits end up being more expensive than perpetrator suits.”).
44. See Anderson, supra note 31; EDURISK, CONFRONTING CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT:
AN EXAMINATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION CLAIMS 14 (2015) http://www.ncdsv.org/ERS_
Confronting-Campus-Sexual-Assault_2015.pdf (“Victims brought the most litigation against
educational institutions and accounted for 68 percent of the litigated complaints in this
study.”). Many of these cases allege institutional negligence. Swan, supra note 43, at 979.
45. Anderson, supra note 31 (emphasis added).
46. Liability for Student Sexual Assault: UE’s Claims Say OCR and Title IX Are Not the
Biggest Dangers, UNITED EDUCATORS: RISK MGMT. INSIGHTS BLOG (Mar. 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/W6MA-AC4Y.
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complainants.47 Notably, schools have often used procedural hurdles that
“harken back to pre-reform rape law,”48 including requirements that
complaints be “timely” filed, skeptically viewed, and corroborated by
additional evidence beyond that of the complaining party.49
Statements from Harvard College in the early 2000s typify this approach.
When considering whether to implement new procedures to govern sexual
misconduct adjudication, the Dean of the college conveyed that Harvard
lacked the tools to effectively adjudicate “‘he-said-she-said’ rape
complaints,”50 and enacted the following procedures:
Complaints must ordinarily be brought to the College in a timely
manner. The Board typically cannot resolve peer dispute cases in
which there is little evidence except the conflicting statements of
the principals. Therefore, the Board ordinarily will not consider a
case unless the allegations presented by the complaining party
are supported by independent corroborating evidence. Based on
the information provided at the time of the complaint, the Board
will decide whether or not there appears to be sufficient
corroborating evidence to pursue the complaint. 51
Examples of colleges mishandling sexual assault allegations are legion.
Schools have repeatedly asked complainants questions that “ranged from
insensitive to insulting,” justified the assaults as the victim’s fault, failed to
or delayed investigating, offered inadequate hearings with questionable
findings, failed to provide notice of investigative updates and findings, and
generally tried to discourage rape reporting. 52 One student recounted that
after she informed her school she had been raped by another student, she
was assigned “an undergraduate student ‘lawyer’” and attended a hearing
where she was made to “plead[] her case for seven hours before the Honor
Court, seated at a table with the [student] she sa[id] raped her.” 53
Ultimately, the panel concluded that “because she and her rapist hadn’t
47. See Buzuvis, supra note 6, at 44 (noting plaintiffs’ difficulties in holding
universities accountable under the deliberate-indifference standard and “lackluster responses
by university officials” to the sexual-assault problem on university campuses).
48. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1983.
49. Id. at 1983–84.
50. Id. at 1983.
51. Id.
52. Kayla Webley Adler, Big Shame on Campus, MARIE CLAIRE (Oct. 16, 2013),
https://www.marieclaire.com/politics/news/a8217/big-shame-on-campus/.
53. Id.
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known each other, he couldn't have been aware of how drunk she was or
that she didn’t like being ‘pushed around.’”54
One high-profile example of unfairness to Title IX complainants
involved well-known star college football player Jameis Winston. 55 After
Erica Kinsman informed Florida State University that Jameis Winston
raped her, the university waited twenty-four months to conduct a Title IX
hearing. 56 Despite substantial compelling evidence, including DNA and
visible bruising, the university made a finding of no responsibility. 57
Significant exposés in film and media revealed botched investigations in
both the criminal and Title IX context, and Erica Kinsman eventually
received $950,000 from a civil settlement with Florida State, along with an
agreement that the university would implement substantial reforms in its
Title IX process.58
Indeed, at some schools, the institutional response to sexual assault
allegations has been so systemically egregious that other third parties have
either imposed sanctions or made specific findings of institutional failings.
In 2011, Baylor University’s repeated institutional response to sexual
assault allegations concerning athletes was so troubling that famed college
athletic association “the Big 12 took the rare, if largely symbolic, step of
withholding a quarter of Baylor’s payouts—about $6 million.”59 Similarly,
in 2014, the California State Auditor’s investigation of UC Berkeley
found that from 2009 to 2013, Berkeley did not notify or give
regular updates to parties involved in investigations of sexual
misconduct, did not complete investigations in a timely manner,
and did not ‘sufficiently educate’ staff and students on sexual
misconduct prevention, which led cases to be mishandled and
compromised student safety. 60
54. Id.
55. See Tamara Rice Lave, Ready, Fire, Aim: How Universities Are Failing the
Constitution in Sexual Assault Cases, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637, 638–40 (2016).
56. Id. at 639.
57. Id. at 640.
58. Id.
59. Marc Tracy & Dan Barry, The Rise, Then Shame, of Baylor Nation, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/sports/baylor-football-sexualassault.html.
60. Greta Anderson, Increased Legal Scrutiny for Sexual Assault Policies, INSIDE
HIGHER ED. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/01/31/appealscourt-holds-university-liable-ineffective-title-ix-policies.
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But while many schools continue to procedurally disadvantage
complainants, other schools have recently moved in the opposite direction,
using procedures that disadvantage respondents. 61 As one metric, between
2011 and early 2019, more than 400 respondents sued universities for
problems related to campus sexual misconduct adjudications.62 Nearly half
of those suits resulted in either settlements or judicial decisions favoring the
accused student.63
In John Doe v. Purdue University, for example, Doe alleged that after a
dating relationship ended, he received a letter indicating that his exgirlfriend, Jane, had made a complaint of sexual assault against him. 64 He
was suspended from his Navy program and banned from any school areas
where Jane might be.65 The school withheld the investigation report from
John, letting him “review a redacted version” mere “[m]oments before” his
hearing. 66 Jane did not appear or submit a written statement; instead, an
advocate wrote a letter “summarizing [her] accusations.”67 At the hearing,
“[t]wo members of the panel candidly stated that they had not read the
investigative report,”68 but John was nevertheless found responsible. Even
though Jane was not present at the hearing and never submitted her own
written statement, it was determined that Jane was “a credible witness,” and
John was not.69
San Diego State University student Francisco Sousa faced similar
procedural deficiencies when he was accused of campus sexual assault in
2014.70 The university suspended him on an interim basis and sent an email

61. See Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 1–2.
62. See Jeannie Suk Gersen, Assessing Betsy DeVos’s Proposed Rules on Title IX and
Sexual Assault, NEW YORKER (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-column
ists/assessing-betsy-devos-proposed-rules-on-title-ix-and-sexual-assault.
63. Id.
64. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 656–57 (7th Cir. 2019).
65. Id. at 657. This case was a review of “the magistrate judge’s decision to dismiss
John’s complaint for failing to state a claim.” Id. at 656. Accordingly, the court “recount[ed]
the facts as he describes them, drawing every inference in his favor.” Id. So, “the story that
follows is one-sided because the posture of the case requires it to be.” Id. Nevertheless, the
procedural problems alleged are not unusual. See, e.g., Lave, supra note 55, at 646–47.
66. Doe, 928 F.3d at 657.
67. Id. at 657–58.
68. Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 657–58.
70. See Lave, supra note 55, at 640–41. This Article borrows from Lave in juxtaposing
the Winston case with the Sousa case.
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to the entire student body informing them of the allegations against Sousa. 71
When he “requested to review the basis of the allegations against him,” the
university assured him that he would eventually receive that information
but suggested that he make a statement immediately since the investigator
“could reach a decision in the Title IX portion of the investigation at any
point.”72 The university also informed Sousa that the investigator would
decide issues of fact and law and potentially issue a sanction, but that Sousa
was “not entitled to a hearing” on the sexual misconduct allegation, that he
would have no opportunity to question the complainant, that he could not
have counsel directly participate in the process, and that no appeal would be
possible. 73
These cases exemplify the most common problems that render Title IX
procedurally unfair to respondents, including no discovery rights, limited
access to the allegations and to the investigation report, limited or no
opportunity to present a defense, and a refusal to allow for legal
representation.74 These flaws fall below generally accepted standards of due
process and, where they occur, usually render adjudications procedurally
unfair to defendants.75
III. Discriminatory Dualism
Many scholars and commentators frame the emergence of the reverse
Title IX strand as an “over-correction,” triggered by schools’ eagerness to
comply with the Obama-era Title IX regime and retain their federal
funding.76 But this does not fully capture the nature and consequences of
the procedural switch. Just as the flips in the other examples of
discriminatory dualism were not “overcorrections,” reverse Title IX is also
not simply an overcorrection in response to concerns about the first
discriminatory form. Rather, switching into a reverse mode of
71. Id. at 640; see Gary Warth, SDSU Lifts Suspension Against Student, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2015, 5:31 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/
education/sdut-sdsu-lifts-suspension-of-student-accused-of-2015sep01-story.html.
72. Lave, supra note 55, at 641.
73. Id.
74. See id.; see also Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 2–3.
75. See Lave, supra note 55, at 645.
76. Kathryn Joyce, The Takedown of Title IX, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 5, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05/magazine/the-takedown-of-title-ix.html; see also Alexandra
Brodsky, A Rising Tide: Learning About Fair Disciplinary Process from Title IX, 66 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 822, 825 (2017).
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discriminatory action is a common, reoccurring, and powerful means of
maintaining social hierarchies and existing status quos. 77
The example of workplace sexual harassment and shunning provides the
closest parallel to Title IX’s current state. In the sexual harassment and
shunning example of discriminatory dualism, sexual harassment, defined as
unwanted sexual attention, couples with shunning, defined as no attention at
all.78 After the #MeToo movement exposed the problem and prevalence of
sexual harassment in the workplace, some male workers responded by
shunning and simply refusing to work closely or at all with their female
colleagues. 79 Academic studies, surveys, and anecdotal data reported that
over one-quarter of men confirmed that in the post-#MeToo era they would
“avoid one-on-one meetings with female co-workers,” twenty-one percent
would “be reluctant to hire women for a job that would require close
interaction,” and nineteen percent would “be reluctant to hire an attractive
woman.”80
Like Title IX’s procedural flip, shunning in the workplace was also
largely framed as an “overcorrection.”81 Multiple popular media articles
explained the movement as male workers trying so hard to comply with not
sexually harassing someone that they separated themselves entirely from
77. Swan, supra note 21, at 874–75.
78. Id. at 886.
79. Id. at 886–87.
80. See Arwa Mahdawi, Men Now Avoid Women at Work-Another Sign We Are Being
Punished for #MeToo, GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2019, 1:00 AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.
com/lifeandstyle/2019/aug/29/men-women-workplace-study-harassment-harvard-metoo.
81. See, e.g., #MeToo Backlash Has Employers Telling Staff Not to Overcorrect,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 19, 2018, 11:39 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-andpractice/metoo-backlash-has-employers-telling-staff-not-to-overcorrect; Sexual Harassment
in Law Firms – a Law Office Management Program, NJ INST. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.
(June 26, 2018), https://tcms.njsba.com/personifyebusiness/njicle/CLEPrograms/NJICLE
EventsCalendar/MeetingDetails.aspx?productId=15143049 (denoting “overcorrecting” as a
“Tricky Topic”); Laura Johnston, Can you Compliment a Woman’s Outfit at Work? In Wake
of #MeToo Movement, There Are No Office Guidelines, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 19, 2019),
https://www.cleveland.com/news/erry-2018/09/06bef3b8632945/can-you-compliment-awomans-ou.html; Lili Loofbourow, 8 Big Questions We Need to Ask Ourselves in the Wake
of America’s Sexual Assault Reckoning, WEEK (Nov. 27, 2017), https://theweek.com/
articles/739104/8-big-questions-need-ask-ourselves-wake-americas-sexual-assaultreckoning; Eleanor Holmes Norton, A Commission to Combat Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace Needs to be Created, HILL (Jan. 31, 2018), https://norton.house.gov/mediacenter/press-releases/op-ed-a-commission-to-combat-sexual-harassment-in-the-workplaceneeds-to.
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their female colleagues.82 Out of a purported fear that any behaviors might
be misconstrued as harassment, male workers began to refuse to mentor,
work closely with, or even hire women workers.83
A similar dynamic is seen in Title IX. In both contexts, agitations for
appropriate policies regarding systemic sexual discrimination are met with
an opposite but still discriminatory behavior. And in both cases, the switch
is attributed to a purported fear of negative consequences created by the
agitators themselves. In the sexual harassment/shunning context, the
purported fear is that innocent behavior will be misconstrued. In the Title
IX context, the purported fear is that institutional federal funding will be
lost.84 Like the male workers who protest they are scared of being falsely
accused, schools have been portrayed as frightened of the possibility of
having their federal funding pulled. One open letter, for example, refers to
“terrified” administrators, who, in the wake of the Dear Colleague letter,
“not only complied; they over-complied.”85
In both contexts, those seeking social justice are blamed for the current
predicament. Just as those practicing shunning blamed #MeToo advocates
for driving them to engage in a reverse form of discrimination, some
commentators and institutions blame the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”)
and gender justice advocates for causing the reverse Title IX problem. 86 In
this framing, the threat of losing federal funding was just too much for
schools to bear, and they therefore tried too hard to comply. 87 However, it
is important to note as an initial matter that no school has ever actually lost
82. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 81.
83. Id.
84. Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 1–2.
85. Id. at 2.
86. See, e.g., id. at 1 (“While the Administration’s goals were to provide better
protections for women, and address the neglect that prevailed before this shift, the new
policies and procedures have created problems of their own, many of them attributable to
directives coming from the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights . . . .”); see
also Lave, supra note 55, at 655 (quoting a university administrator as saying, “Whether
truly innocent, the reality is that OCR wants you to take action against [respondents].”). For
court decisions suggesting that the Dear Colleague letter helped cause reverse Title IX, see
Doe v. Purdue University, 928 F.3d 652, 669 (7th Cir. 2019), and Doe v. Miami University,
882 F.3d 579, 594 (6th Cir. 2018).
87. Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 1–2. The other implication of the overcorrection
framing is the suggestion that the “process will eventually right itself” presumably through
some kind of Hegelian dialectic process, and that the error is just part of a natural process
moving toward the right balance. Johnston, supra note 81. The history of discriminatory
dualism suggests that this is not the likely outcome. See Swan, supra note 21, at 925.
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federal funding as a result of this kind of Title IX complaint.88 Even schools
that behaved so egregiously that other third parties sanctioned them or
pulled their own funding never lost federal funding.89
Further, neither Title IX nor the Obama-era guidelines demanded
procedures unfair to respondents.90 In fact, of the top ten procedural
safeguards that the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education presents
as “fundamental elements of due process,” eight are actually “required by
Title IX, the Clery Act or the guidance letter.”91
Indeed, as these due process requirements suggest, in many cases the
schools that engage in procedurally unfair practices for respondents are
actively violating OCR recommendations. As “one longtime campus-safety
expert who consults with colleges and universities about sexual
misconduct” bluntly explained, schools that have been “taking shortcuts to
justice” are “violating policy or breaking the law.”92 The OCR has
specifically denounced these kinds of process errors. For example, in 2016,
the OCR found that Wesley College had violated Title IX through
procedural unfairness to respondents. 93 Specifically, a student “accused of
livestreaming a fellow student having sex, without her consent . . . never
received information from the school about the accusation or the available
88. Kelly Alison Behre, Deconstructing the Disciplined Student Narrative and Its
Impact on Campus Sexual Assault Policy, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 885, 914 (2019) (“Although
OCR has the ability to sanction schools by removing federal aid, it has never done so as a
result of a Title IX complaint.”). One OCR figure did warn a group of college administrators
that despite the fact that a loss of funding had never happened, pulling federal funding was
not “an empty threat.” Nancy Gertner, Sex, Lies and Justice: Can We Reconcile the Belated
Attention to Rape on Campus with Due Process, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 12, 2015),
https://prospect.org/justice/sex-lies-justice/.
89. See infra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
90. Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Lawsuits Against Universities for Alleged Mishandling of Sexual Misconduct Cases, STOP
ABUSE & VIOLENT ENV’TS 1 (2016), http://www.saveservices.org/wp-content/uploads/
Sexual-Misconduct-Lawsuits-Report2.pdf (“[M]any colleges implemented changes that
went well beyond the requirements of the Dear Colleague Letter, such as relying on a single
investigator to adjudicate the case and imposing interim sanctions before the investigation
was completed.”); see also Gertner, supra note 88, at 22 (criticizing the procedures Harvard
implemented and noting that “[n]othing in the OCR’s 2011 ‘Dear Colleague’ letter called for
a proceeding remotely like this”).
91. Joyce, supra note 76 (emphasis added). One of these exceptions is the presumption
of innocence, which arguably “violates Title IX’s requirement that adjudicators make no
presumptions whatsoever.” Id.
92. Id.
93. Brodsky, supra note 76, at 822.
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evidence. He was invited to attend an informal educational meeting only to
discover the ‘chat’ was in fact a disciplinary hearing.”94 The OCR held this
proceeding was a violation of Title IX.95
Heaping blame for reverse Title IX on gender justice advocates is
similarly misplaced. Like the OCR, many of these groups have specifically
affirmed the importance of fair procedures in the Title IX context and called
for remedying “all unjust deprivations of the right to learn.”96 For example,
six organizations penned an open letter to universities urging them to adopt
procedures fair to all parties. 97
Blaming social justice advocates for causing discriminatory practices to
occur, meeting agitations for change by switching into an opposing form of
discrimination, and framing that form as an “over-correction” are all
features of Title IX’s procedural discriminatory dualism that map neatly
onto the example of sexual harassment/shunning. However, there is one
important area of apparent disjunction between these two examples: at first
glance, it appears that the group receiving the Title IX discrimination has
changed. Since procedures weighted against complainants discriminate
against complainants, the logical extension is that procedures weighted
against respondents discriminate against respondents. But discriminatory
dualism thrives on cognitive dissonance. It rests on the intellectually jarring
idea that two opposing practices can nevertheless both perpetuate the same
discriminatory harm. 98 In the Title IX context, this idea is pushed to its
extreme, as it would seem that the two practices actually discriminate
against different groups.
Notably, though, the separate groups idea also occurred in the context of
another example of discriminatory dualism. In the context of policing,
“scholars struggling to make sense of the under and overpolicing
paradox . . . tried to draw distinctions” between the groups each practice
involved, suggesting that “underpolicing affects victims, while overpolicing
affects perpetrators, [and] young people feel overpoliced while older folks
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Know Your IX et al., Letter to University Presidents on Fair Process,
KNOWYOURIX. ORG (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.knowyourix.org/letter-universitypresidents-fair-process. The six organizations are Know Your IX, Carry That Weight, No
Red Tape, Our Harvard Can Do Better, CalArts Sexual Respect Task Force, 7,000 in
Solidarity: A Campaign Against Sexual Assault, and Phoenix Survivors Alliance at the
University of Chicago.
98. See Swan, supra note 21, at 872.
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feel underprotected.”99 In fact, though, these distinctions failed to fully
account for the complexity of the phenomenon and its impact.
Such is the case with Title IX’s discriminatory dualism as well. Despite
initial appearances, Title IX’s discriminatory dualism ultimately functions
to sustain existing gendered and social hierarchies. On a structural and
collective level, Title IX’s procedural discriminatory dualism, including
reverse Title IX, ultimately inures to the detriment of women. This happens
via three main mechanisms. First, consistent with the usual practices of
discriminatory dualism, procedural unfairness to respondents functions to
“confirm” the stereotype underlying the initial procedural problems with
Title IX: that women are not credible witnesses and are committed, at all
costs, to punishing men for perceived slights and imagined harms. Second,
procedural unfairness to respondents enables Title IX opponents to suggest
that unfairness to defendants is the “real” problem of Title IX adjudication,
thereby overshadowing and undermining continuing problems of unfairness
to complainants. The ensuing confusion over what is the “real” problem
with Title IX processes discredits the entire process of adjudication,
throwing suspicion onto all findings of responsibility in the Title IX
context. Finally, discriminatory dualism in Title IX establishes a double
bind, under which universities are portrayed as capable only of adjudicating
in ways that are unfair to complainants or unfair to defendants. These
consequences all work to the detriment of those seeking gender equality.
A. Stereotype Affirmation
One hallmark of discriminatory dualism is that it often appears to affirm
stereotypes. 100 In the sexual harassment and shunning context, the
99. Id. at 899 n.188; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1715, 1731 (2006). But, as Monica Bell writes, the situation is more complex: “Many
young men, too, would ideally want the police to protect them and their communities.”
Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J.
2054, 2119 (2017) (describing a “conflicted desire for police protection”).
100. For example, in the context of redlining and reverse redlining, the defaults resulting
from reverse redlining seemingly confirmed the stereotype that “African Americans in
particular, and people of color in general, are high credit risks and their presence in
neighborhoods leads to declining property values.” Swan, supra note 21, at 902–03. In
actuality, “‘although minority borrowers were targeted for subprime loans at
disproportionate rates,’ simple population demographics mean that ‘they did not receive the
majority of these loans, nor have they been more prone to foreclosure than white
homeowners.’” Id. at 903 (quoting Charles L. Nier III & Maureen R. St. Cyr, A Racial
Financial Crisis: Rethinking the Theory of Reverse Redlining to Combat Predatory Lending

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/5

2020]

DISCRIMINATORY DUALISM IN PROCESS

87

“affirmed” stereotype is that women’s complaints are unreliable, and
women often complain about nothing. When women complain about both
sexual harassment and shunning simultaneously, this stereotype looks true:
women complain when male workers give them too much unwanted sexual
attention, and then when they are given less attention, they complain about
that, too. This conflict allows opponents of sexual equality to suggest all the
complaints are unjustified nonsense. 101
The stereotype at work in the Title IX context is similar: that women are
not credible witnesses and are committed, at all costs, to punishing men for
perceived slights, imagined harms, and regrets surrounding their own
engagement in sexual encounters. Title IX procedures that are stacked
against complainants—like requiring additional corroborating evidence
before commencing an investigation, or imposing a higher standard of
evidence—are rooted in this stereotype.
The stereotype that women are unreliable narrators of sexual harm has a
long pedigree. One of its more infamous historical moments was Judge
Matthew Hales’s warning in the seventeenth century that rape is a crime
“easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended.”102 In
keeping with this stereotype, until rape reform measures began in the
criminal law in the 1970s, many states required “extrinsic corroborating
evidence” before they would allow a rape conviction to stand. 103 A 1970
law review article purportedly explained how and why women lie about
rape: “Women often falsely accuse men of sexual attacks to extort money,
to force marriage, to satisfy a childish desire for notoriety, or to attain
personal revenge.”104 The article also noted that sometimes women were
simply deluded, and in such cases “these neurotic individuals can often
deceive the most astute judges and jurors into believing that the imagined
attack actually occurred.”105
Under the Fair Housing Act, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 941, 948 (2011)). And in the context of under
and overpolicing, the stereotype serving as an “underlying premise” is that “people of color
commit more crime and therefore must be subjected to harsher police tactics.” Swan, supra
note 21, at 901 (quoting ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 2 (2017)). Overpolicing then
purportedly “reveals” a high level of criminal activity while simultaneously masking the role
of underpolicing in “perpetuating the problem of unsolved violent crime.” Id. at 902.
101. Id. at 904–05.
102. The Corroboration Rule and Crimes Accompanying a Rape, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 458,
458 (1970).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 460.
105. Id.
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This stereotype continues to inform the perceived “dangers” of reverse
Title IX scenarios. When Title IX’s procedures are unfairly stacked against
respondents, the stereotype that women are desperate liars who will use
every means possible to falsely accuse and punish men is purportedly
affirmed by their seeming push to abandon any due process restraints that
could challenge their onslaught of false accusations.106 In essence, the lack
of procedural fairness becomes yet another method women use to
perpetuate their false accusations of sexual harm, reaffirming the initial
position of Title IX: that stacking the procedural deck against complainants
is necessary, justified, and correct.107
B. Confusion over the “Real” Title IX Problem
Another common thread in examples of discriminatory dualism is that its
bifurcation into two seemingly opposing strands confuses the true nature of
the problem. 108 The inherent contradiction in a situation of two opposing
problematic practices is befuddling. 109 Commentators have helpfully given
voice to this confusion in the context of under and overpolicing, “How can
a community be simultaneously over-policed and under-policed?”110 “Are
there too many police or are there too few?” 111 The two strands seem as
though they should cancel each other out, and that both should not be able
to occur simultaneously.112
In the Title IX context, it is difficult to reconcile procedural unfairness to
complainants co-existing with procedural unfairness to respondents, and
those arguing for a diminished role for Title IX have thus been able to float
reverse Title IX as the “real,” more dominant problem.113 With this telling,
106. See Emily Yoffe, Reining in the Excesses of Title IX, ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/title-ix-reforms-are-overdue/569215/;
see also Joyce, supra note 76.
107. Joyce, supra note 76; see also Swan, supra note 21, at 905 (citing Deborah Epstein
& Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’
Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2019)).
108. Swan, supra note 21, at 899.
109. Id.
110. Natapoff, supra note 99, at 1718.
111. Vann R. Newkirk II, What We Are Getting Wrong About Police Reform, GAWKER
(Nov. 9, 2015 12:50 PM), https://gawker.com/what-we-are-getting-wrong-about-policereform-1740865621.
112. See Swan, supra note 21, at 899–900.
113. See, e.g., Home, SAVE OUR SONS, https://helpsaveoursons.com/ (last visited Aug. 17,
2020) (introducing an organization “dedicated to the families whose college sons have been
falsely accused of sexual misconduct”); see also Behre, supra note 88, at 900.
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the main problem with Title IX adjudication is that it has become a way to
oppress men. 114 This position has been given extra heft by concerns over
whether reverse Title IX perpetuates racial injustice and disproportionately
punishes Black men and men of color.115 Unfortunately, obtaining specific
data on race and Title IX is difficult because the OCR does not gather this
information. 116 We know that racism is part of the bedrock of the American
legal system, but there is “little specific information about the scope,
frequency, or impact of racism on accused and disciplined students in
campus sexual misconduct adjudications.”117
Nevertheless, some of the information that does exist is deeply
troubling.118 For example, one collection of data from Colgate University
suggests that in 2012–2013, while Black students comprised only 4.2
percent of the student population, they comprised 50 percent of those
accused of sexual misconduct and “40 percent of the students who went
through the formal disciplinary process.”119 Sending a disproportionate
number of Black men through the Title IX complaint system accords with
“[t]he general social disadvantage that black men continue to carry in our
culture,” which “make[s] it easier for everyone in the adjudicative process
to put the blame on them,”120 and corresponds with the tradition that white
society has “long over-sexualized, over-criminalized and disproportionately
punished black men.”121
At the same time, though, these conversations sometimes ignore the
perspectives of Black women and women of color, and the racial impacts of
procedural unfairness to complainants.122 As one commentator noted, two
cases that have been held up as examples of potential racism against Black
114. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Higher Education Discriminates Against Men, but
Title IX Complaints May Change That, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 2019, 6:00 AM ET) (noting
that Title IX “has been turned into a club with which to beat male students”).
115. See Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Sex Bureaucracy, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-sex-bureaucracy/.
116. Lara Bazelon, I’m a Democrat and a Feminist. And I Support Betsy DeVos’s Title IX
Reforms, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/opinion/-title-ixdevos-democrat-feminist.html.
117. Behre, supra note 88, at 937.
118. Bazelon, supra note 116.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX
Enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103 (2015)).
121. Bazelon, supra note 116.
122. Behre, supra note 88, at 938.
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men are often referenced without acknowledging that they also suggest that
white women and women of color receive disparate outcomes when they
accuse the same person of sexual misconduct.123 One student queried why
commentators seem quick to agree “that Black men are disproportionately
and wrongly implicated in on-campus sexual assault proceedings,” yet
“ignore[] well-established research on the disproportionate rate at which
women of color are sexually assaulted.”124
The confusion created by dueling procedural problems allows reverse
Title IX to be presented as the main problem of campus sexual assault
adjudication. From there, reverse Title IX overshadows and undermines the
continuing procedural problems to complainants, including Black women
and women of color.125 Further, the contestation of this positioning and the
confusion created by the seemingly competing complaints of unfairness to
respondents and unfairness to complainants functions to undermine all
findings made within the Title IX system. Procedures that are unfair to
complainants in some instances and unfair to respondents in others make it
seem like the whole system is simply unworkable and produces results that
cannot be trusted. Whereas due process allows a community to be confident
in adjudicative outcomes, doubts about process can make all holdings seem
suspect.126 The emergence of reverse Title IX and the rhetoric surrounding
it join with the paradoxical nature of Title IX’s procedural problems to cast
a cloud of suspicion over all findings made under the system, no matter
how valid they may be.
C. Discriminatory Dualism’s Double Bind
Another conceptual trap of discriminatory dualism is that the opposing
practice is presented as an answer or solution to the first practice. 127
Reverse Title IX emerged as an apparent response to complainants’ calls
for a fairer process. The binary thereby formed is a false dichotomy under
which complainants appear to have “gotten what they asked for.”128 Even
though neither Title IX advocates nor the OCR requested to switch from a
123. Id. at 939.
124. Kamilah Willingham, To the Harvard 19: Do Better, MEDIUM (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://medium.com/@kamily/to-the-harvard-law-19-do-better-1353794288f2#.tgcony5uo.
125. See Behre, supra note 88, at 939.
126. See Brodsky, supra note 76, at 830–31.
127. Swan, supra note 21, at 912.
128. See KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 1730
(2015) (noting a similar dynamic with “You want marriage? We’ll give you marriage!”) .

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/5

2020]

DISCRIMINATORY DUALISM IN PROCESS

91

process that was weighted against complainants to one weighted against
respondents, by positioning itself as an answer to the first procedural
fairness problem, reverse Title IX creates a double bind of only two
possibilities: unfairness to complainants, or unfairness to respondents.
In this binary, procedural fairness to respondents and redress for campus
sexual assault are presented as mutually exclusive: you can have one, but
not the other.129 In this “zero-sum game” framing, “any increase in civil
rights obtained by students to be free from sexual misconduct results in a
reciprocal decrease in rights for male students.” 130 The political message of
this position is that “[s]chools can either prevent and respond to gender
violence or protect accused students’ rights,” but not both. 131 Notions and
imagery like “overcorrections” and “a pendulum swinging too far”132
suggest “a single axis of justice . . . on which every gain for one side is a
loss of the other.”133
Many scholars and commentators decry this false dichotomy, and point
out that advancing procedural fairness to respondents and creating a campus
safe from sexual violence are not mutually exclusive goals. 134 Rather,
everyone has an interest in both goals being met, and “procedural pitfalls,
like biased boards, insufficient transparency, untrained staff, and poor
guidance” are harmful to both victims and accused students. 135 They
elongate already “painful process[es]” as “internal appeals and subsequent
litigation” delay closure and healing. 136 Advocates of Title IX are keenly
aware that “[n]o one wins when processes are unfair,”137 and that the
procedural unfairness that currently plagues Title IX is profoundly
“counter-productive, undermining the legitimacy of the important project of
addressing sexual misconduct.”138 The entire community is best served
when Title IX is perceived as procedurally fair:
Just as fair criminal procedures encourage people to ‘buy in’ to
legal systems and ‘adhere to agreements and follow rules over
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 5.
Behre, supra note 88, at 927.
Brodsky, supra note 76, at 825.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 828–29.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 828–29.
Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 7.
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time,’ ethical and equitable campus disciplinary procedures will
likely improve student participants’ trust in hearing boards and
acceptance of their decisions. Over time, fair procedures should
lead to greater community faith in campus discipline, allowing
colleges to take the steps necessary to build safe and just
campuses. 139
Title IX’s discriminatory dualism, though, sets up two untenable options
as the only possibilities, and does so using a frame in which fairness to
complainants and fairness to respondents seem irreconcilable. Not
surprisingly, then, this apparent double bind has caused many
commentators to “throw up their hands and propose . . . that schools should
not decide these cases at all,” and that sexual misconduct allegations should
instead be handled by law enforcement. 140
Unfortunately, law enforcement and the criminal system of adjudication
are not effective mechanisms for addressing sexual assault.141 As Catherine
MacKinnon once summarized, “In the United States most rapes are never
reported. Most reported rapes are not prosecuted. Most prosecuted rapes do
not result in convictions. The vast majority of rapists are never held
accountable for their actions.”142 From rape kit backlogs to persistent
inattention from the police, criminal law enforcement activities have shown
little to no ability to fairly adjudicate sexual assault claims. 143 Thus, the net
result of the recommendations to transfer all adjudications to the criminal
system would be to diminish any chance of remedy or redress for rape and
campus sexual misconduct.
This result would thwart the entire purpose of Title IX. Relinquishing all
sexual misconduct claims to the criminal system would not assist goals of
educational access. It is paramount that “[a] school . . . be able to discipline
students for violating its conduct codes and protect its students from harm,
whether or not the violations are also crimes.” 144 But the double bind of
Title IX’s discriminatory dualism suggests that schools are simply unable to

139.
140.
141.
(2013).
142.
143.
144.

Brodsky, supra note 76, at 831.
Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 4.
See Sarah Swan, Triangulating Rape, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 403, 421
CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 751–52 (2007).
For further discussion of these problems, see Swan, supra note 141, at 421–22.
Bartholet et al., supra note 17, at 4.
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fairly adjudicate claims of sexual misconduct. 145 This message destabilizes
and undermines the entire remedial system.
IV. Discriminatory Dualism and the Future of Title IX
Title IX’s double bind functions to narrow the perceived field of options
to only two choices: unfairness to complainants or unfairness to
respondents. In limiting the perceived possibilities of the system, the
discriminatory dualism of Title IX serves to “repress aspirations for
alternative . . . arrangements.”146 The sphere of available answers becomes
limited to a bleak future where either campus sexual assault adjudication is
removed from the purview of Title IX or Title IX simply oscillates between
its two procedurally unfair forms in perpetuity.
A. The New Title IX Regulations
At the time of this writing, Title IX is currently poised at the precipice of
another significant oscillation. In response to the untenable situation created
by Title IX’s discriminatory dualism, the Trump Administration created a
new set of regulations, which took effect in August 2020.147 These
regulations were open to a lengthy notice and comment period and attracted
numerous responses on both sides of the issue. 148 The new procedural
regime created by these regulations includes some reasonable procedural
requirements. For example, schools must give the accused student written
notice detailing the allegations, let students review the evidence the
investigation report relies on, and allow students to respond in writing
before the report is filed. 149 But the new regulations also include more
controversial requirements.150 Under the new regulations, schools must
145. Id. at 4–5.
146. See Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1358, 1361 (1982).
147. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30026, 30045–46, 30574 (final rule
published May 19, 2020, effective Aug. 14, 2020) (codified at 34 C.F.R. 106.44(a)); see also
Erica L. Green, Lawsuits Aim to Block DeVos’s New Sexual Misconduct Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(July 10, 2020, 5:03 AM EST), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/us/politics/sexualmisconduct-betsy-devos.html.
148. See Daniel Kees, The New Face of Title IX Due Process, REG. REV. (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/02/06/kees-new-face-title-ix-due-process/.
149. Id.
150. For example, under the new requirements, “universities are no longer obligated to
investigate most sexual assaults that occur off-campus, where an estimated 80 percent of
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employ a presumption of innocence, rather than the former neutral stance,
hold a “live hearing that could include cross-examination” (conducted by
someone other than the accused student and possibly with the students in
separate rooms), and use a clear and convincing evidentiary standard if that
standard is used in any other disciplinary context. 151
Changes like a higher evidentiary standard portend a return to weighting
Title IX adjudication against complainants. Concerned public and private
actors thus filed numerous lawsuits challenging the new regulations. 152 The
Attorneys General of almost twenty states filed suit, arguing that the rules
are arbitrary and capricious,153 and gender and social justice advocacy
centers, supported by a group of law professors, also challenged the
rules. 154 These groups argued that the new regulations reinvigorate the
gender stereotype that caused the initial procedural problems with Title IX
and that “[t]he department’s decision to single out sex-based harassment for
uniquely burdensome and inequitable procedures is evidence of their intent
to discriminate based on sex.”155 Challengers also note that “[s]kepticism of
women reporting sexual misconduct is so ingrained in our culture and legal
history that the mere suggestion that a student could be disciplined for a
campus code violation involving sexual misconduct based on 50.1%
certainty—the preponderance of evidence standard—regularly invokes
outrage,”156 and the new regulations are supporting such skepticism.

college students live, or to complete their inquiry within 60 days. Professors and
administrators no long have to report sexual violence when they’re informed of an incident”
and the definition of sexual harassment has been narrowed. Hélène Barthélemy, How Men’s
Rights Groups Helped Rewrite Regulations on Campus Rape, NATION (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/betsy-devos-title-ix-mens-rights/ (last visited
Aug. 27, 2020).
151. Kees, supra note 148. The proposed regulations also prohibit gag orders, mandate
that the investigative and adjudicative portions be conducted by a different person, and
require that evidentiary “rape shield” laws apply to the hearings. The guidelines also require
that “all remedies must be designed to ‘restore or preserve access’ to the [school]’s
education program or activity.” Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education
Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30026, 30045–
46, 30258, 30487, 30575 (final rule published May 19, 2020, effective Aug. 14, 2020)
(codified at 34 C.F.R. 106.44(a)).
152. Green, supra note 147.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Behre, supra note 88, at 932.
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Further, although the new regulations purport to merely allow schools to
adopt a higher evidentiary standard, in reality, they are structured in such a
way that a higher standard will be “effectively required, in many cases.” 157
For cases involving potential sexual harassment, the new regulations
require schools to apply the same standard to sexual misconduct allegations
against students as they do for faculty. But the collective bargaining
agreements and contracts that govern faculty disciplinary hearings usually
require a clear and convincing standard to be used. 158 In other words, “the
New Rule effectively imposes a heightened standard as a requirement for
student complaints without saying so.” 159
The significance of the applicable standard of proof for sexual
misconduct complaints is hard to overstate. The consequences of a higher
standard are “impossible to ignore . . . [H]istory shows that this type of
complacency has led to inequality, harassment and real harm to women and
vulnerable members of society.”160 In fact, the new regulations are
consciously designed to “reduce the number of sexual harassment
allegations the schools investigate and remedy,” with the Department itself
estimating that the new regulations will result in postsecondary schools
conducting 33% fewer investigations, K-12 schools conducting 50% fewer
investigations, and a reduction in the number of “hearings, decisions, and
informal resolutions” more generally. 161 In accordance with how deterrence
operates, “overwhelming evidence” suggests that a decrease in the number
of investigations will lead to an increase in harassment occurrences. 162
B. Paths Forward
Discriminatory dualism creates systems with a polarity that is difficult to
break. When complainants called for fairer procedures, some schools
answered with procedures that blatantly worked against respondents,
157. Brief for Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction or 5 U.S.C. Sec. 705, Victim Rights Law Ctr. et al. v. DeVos et al.,
No. 1:20-CV-11104 (D. Mass. 2020) [hereinafter Law Professors’ Amicus Brief].
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Michael Spratt, The Presumption of Innocence Is for Courtrooms, Not Politics (Jan.
27, 2018), http://www.michaelspratt.com/law-blog/the-presumption-of-innocence-is-for-thecourt-of-law-not-for-protecting-the-reputations-of-the-powerful (providing an edited version
of spoken remarks made at the 2019 Runnymede Society’s Law and Freedom Conference).
161. Law Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 157 (citing New Rule at 30,551, 30,565–
68).
162. Id.
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though this is not what complainants requested. Most recently, though,
when respondents called for fairer procedures, they were answered with the
Trump Administration’s rules, which will likely work against complainants
once again and actually satisfy the requests of many men’s rights groups. 163
There are templates for equitable procedures that could work within the
Title IX context—like those of the civil courts164 or universal student
conduct codes, for example. 165 But in the current political environment and
within Title IX’s current system of procedural discriminatory dualism, it is
increasingly difficult to imagine that any proposed procedure will
ultimately be implemented in a way that achieves the goals of Title IX. 166
In circumstances where agitations for change are met with systems that
reify existing hierarchies, survivors of sexual violence remain
understandably reluctant to pursue remedies through formal legal structures
like Title IX.167 When “[t]he legal logics that produce patterns of silence in
response to sexual violence are [so] deeply embedded in socio-cultural
structures and norms” that even formal law reforms cannot displace them, it
becomes challenging to see any path forward. 168 Yet the double bind of
discriminatory dualism may, perhaps ironically, provide an opportunity for
reconceptualization.169
Other discriminatory dualism examples suggest that polarities will
continue to govern unless a solution is crafted that anticipates the rise of the
reverse form occurring and aims beyond the problematic institutions. 170
Indeed, sometimes the only discernible fix for discriminatory dualism is
moving away from the institutions engaged in the discriminatory
163. The new Title IX regulations were designed in “collaboration” with many men’s
rights groups. Those groups have “publicly demeaned the credibility of young women,
ridiculed sexual assault survivors, and pushed junk science on campus rape.” See
Barthélemy, supra note 150.
164. See Swan, supra note 43, at 976.
165. See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, Is Relying on Title IX a Mistake?, 64 KAN. L.
REV. 891, 893 (2016).
166. For a discussion of the difference in the mandatory nature of the new regulations
versus the discretionary nature of the Dear Colleague guidance, see Greta Anderson, U.S.
Publishes New Regulations on Campus Sexual Assault, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 7, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/05/07/education-department-releases-final-titleix-regulations.
167. Debra L. DeLaet & Elizabeth Mills, Discursive Silence as a Global Response to
Sexual Violence: From Title IX to Truth Commissions, 32 GLOBAL SOC’Y 496, 505 (2018).
168. Id.
169. See Swan, supra note 21, at 918.
170. Id.
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practices.171 For example, one way to break away from redlining and
reverse redlining is to disinvest from the financial institutions that continue
to discriminate in these ways, opting instead to use banks with better track
records.172 But given the hierarchical structure of post-secondary education
in the United States, simply refusing to affiliate with certain institutions
may not be an effective response in this context.
Nevertheless, Title IX’s discriminatory dualism might provide a moment
to query how the mission of Title IX could be supported by other measures
not wholly dependent on ex post adjudication, including more attention to
preventative measures and measures that focus on the cultural norms which
allow these forms of violence to flourish in the first place.173 Then, instead
of seeking justice by focusing on formally punishing perpetrators,
approaches emphasizing the healing, empowerment, and agency of
survivors can be explored.174 It may be that “the limits of formal law as a
mechanism for promoting justice for survivors of sexual violence” urge us
to move away from reliance on legal vehicles that respond only after
violence has occurred, and instead drive us to “pursue initiatives that seek
to transform culture and to reduce the incidence of sexual violence.” 175
These initiatives might include “[m]ajor efforts to expand socio-cultural
understandings of consent and initiatives to educate young people about
consent and healthy sexual relationships,”176 with the goal of “reduc[ing]
the incidence of sexual violence and . . . pursu[ing] justice rooted in gender
equity.”177
Such initiatives fit well with the educational mission of colleges and
universities. 178 Numerous states have little to no sex education for their
secondary school students, meaning many students arrive on college
campuses with little or no sexual sophistication or knowledge. For example,
in Texas, “sixty percent of Texas public school districts teach abstinence
only sex education and 25 percent have no sex education programs at
171. Id.
172. Id. at 914.
173. See generally Erin R. Collins, The Criminalization of Title IX, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 365 (2016).
174. DeLaet & Mills, supra note 167, at 509.
175. Id. at 509–10.
176. Id. at 510.
177. Id.
178. Also, “[t]he Dear Colleague Letter emphasized the role of educational programming
in a university’s duty to prevent sexual violence and the SaVE Act elaborated upon and
codified the requirement.” Collins, supra note 173, at 382.
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all.”179 More focus on ensuring young adults have received education on
issues of intimacy, sex, and consent could reinforce norms about
appropriate sexual conduct180 and assist the resolve of young people to
discourage others from engaging in inappropriate conduct.181
In addition to this type of preventative work, a wider range of redress
mechanisms could be offered. 182 Traditional disciplinary hearings need not
be the only method of redressing sexual harm when it has occurred on
campus: restorative or transformative justice frameworks may provide
mechanisms of accountability that some sexual harm survivors prefer over
standard adjudication using any set of procedural rules.183 Although these
kinds of mechanisms risk being coopted into tools for replicating and
reifying existing social hierarchies, mindfully guarding against these
influences may allow these processes to flourish and offer victims a greater
role in choosing what form of repair would be most meaningful to them. 184
Restorative and transformative justice may offer much to all stakeholders in
redressing sexual violence:
For those harmed, restoration means repairing the actual damage
caused by wrongdoing and restoring their sense of control over
their lives. For wrongdoers, restoration involves accepting
179. Julia Zaksek, Expanding University Sex Education Would Fill in Gaps, Help
Students, DAILY TEXAN (Mar. 26, 2019, 6:19 PM), https://thedailytexan.com/2019/03/26/
expanding-university-sex-education-would-fill-in-gaps-help-students.
180. One study concluded that “[p]re-college comprehensive sexuality education,
including skills-based training in refusing unwanted sex, may be an effective strategy for
preventing sexual assault in college.” John S. Santelli et al., Does Sex Education Before
College Protect Students From Sexual Assault in College? 13 PLOS ONE 11, 11 (2018).
181. Such programming would differ from the rape-prevention and bystander training
required under the SaVE Act. See Collins, supra note 173, at 383. “Under this regime,
schools must teach students how to avoid risky situations, how to intervene if they see a
suspect situation unfolding, and what to do in the aftermath of an assault. They are not
required, however, to adopt programs that seek to change cultural norms and behaviors so
that such reaction is unnecessary.” Id.
182. See Collins, supra note 173, at 391–95.
183. Id. at 394.
184. Id. The new regulations allow for informal resolution processes. However, these
processes seem unlikely to be a successful means of achieving gender justice while situated
within a larger system that skews toward unfairness to complainants. For a discussion of the
new provisions and their potential impact, see Adrienne Publicover, The New Provisions in
Title IX Regulations – Taking the Right Steps for a Successful Informal Resolution,
JDSUPRA.COM (July 17, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-new-provisions-intitle-ix-51028/.
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responsibility for their actions by repairing any harm that they
caused and dealing with the issues that contributed to the
wrongdoing. For the community, restoration means denouncing
wrongdoers’ behavior and assisting victims and offenders in
their process of restoration.185
Transformative justice goes one step further, encouraging “imagination
beyond [the] current system” that can root out the underlying structures and
supports of sexual violence, and envision new alternatives and
possibilities.186
V. Conclusion
Redressing sexual misconduct and violence in any context is a difficult
endeavor. Complicating the task even further are “the ways in which formal
laws governing sexual violence may reproduce legal logics that reinforce
rather than challenge gendered social orders and patterns of violence.” 187
Discriminatory dualism is one means by which such reification, rather than
transformation, sometimes occurs, and discriminatory dualism has impeded
Title IX’s ability to serve as a successful mechanism for redressing sexual
assault on campus.
With the looming implementation of the regulations crafted by the
Trump administration, Title IX seems all but certain to continue to fail
victims of campus sexual misconduct. Yet the current fears over what Title
IX will look like as these new regulations are implemented also presents a
moment of opportunity for gender and social justice advocates.
Recognizing Title IX’s current discriminatory dualism as a symptom of
intense dysfunction and discrimination prompts reimagining what a
different system might look like. Recognizing that procedural rules for
disciplinary hearings are unlikely to offer, at least in the near future, the
kind of redress many survivors hope for may compel the development of
revolutionary and transformative ideas outside of the disciplinary hearing.

185. From Restorative Justice to Transformative Justice, L. COMM’N CAN. 8 (1999),
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/18455759/from-restorative-justice-to-transfor
mative-justice-discussion-paper- (last visited Aug. 17, 2020).
186. Destabilizing Rape Culture Through Transformative Justice, ANTI-OPPRESSION RES.
& TRAINING ALLIANCE (2013), http://aorta.coop/portfolio_page/destabilizing-rape-culturethrough-transformative-justice/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2020).
187. DeLaet & Mills, supra note 167, at 503.
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